Spyphones are surveillance tools surreptitiously planted what do you say when you talk to yourself pdf a users handheld device. While malicious mobile applications mainly phone fraud applications distributed through common application channels – target the typical consumer, spyphones are nation states tool of attacks.

How are these mobile cyber-espionage attacks carried out? Windows 8 Secure Boot based on UEFI 2. 1 Secure Boot is an important step towards securing platforms from malware compromising boot sequence before the OS. However, there are certain mistakes platform vendors shouldn’t make which can completely undermine protections offered by Secure Boot. We will demonstrate an example of full software bypass of Windows 8 Secure Boot due to such mistakes on some of the latest platforms and explain how those mistakes can be avoided. Incident response is usually a deeply technical forensic investigation and mitigation for an individual organization.

But for incidents that are not merely cyber crime but truly national security events, such as large-scale disruptive attacks that could be acts of war by another nation, the process is completely dissimilar, needing a different kind of thinking. This talk will discuss exactly how, detailing the flow of national security incident response in the United States using the scenario of a major attack on the finance sector. Treasury handles the financial side of the crisis while DHS tackles the technical. If needed, the incident can be escalated to the military and president especially if the incident becomes especially disruptive or destructive.

The talk examines this flow and the actions and decisions within the national security apparatus, concluding with the pros and cons of this approach and comparing it to the process in other key countries. This presentation is a case study showcasing the technical details of Android security bug 8219321, disclosed to Google in February 2013. The presentation will review how the vulnerability was located, how an exploit was created, and why the exploit works, giving you insight into the vulnerability problem and the exploitation process. 5 years Endgame received 20M samples of malware equating to roughly 9. 5 TB of binary data. In this, we’re not alone. Its total corpus is estimated to be about 100M samples.

This huge volume of malware offers both challenges and opportunities for security research especially applied machine learning. Endgame performs static analysis on malware in order to extract feature sets used for performing large-scale machine learning. Since malware research has traditionally been the domain of reverse engineers, most existing malware analysis tools were designed to process single binaries or multiple binaries on a single computer and are unprepared to confront terabytes of malware simultaneously. Our early attempts to process this data did not scale well with the increasing flood of samples. As the size of our malware collection increased, the system became unwieldy and hard to manage, especially in the face of hardware failures.

Over the past two years we refined this system into a dedicated framework based on Hadoop so that our large-scale studies are easier to perform and are more repeatable over an expanding dataset. This framework is built over Apache Hadoop, Apache Pig, and Python. It addresses many issues of scalable malware processing, including dealing with increasingly large data sizes, improving workflow development speed, and enabling parallel processing of binary files with most pre-existing tools. It is also modular and extensible, in the hope that it will aid security researchers and academics in handling ever-larger amounts of malware. In addition, we will demonstrate the results of our exploration and the techniques used to derive these results. To justify the importance of 800-155, in this talk we look at the implementation of the SRTM from a vendor’s pre-800-155 laptop.

We discuss how the BIOS and thus SRTM can be manipulated either due to a configuration that does not enable signed BIOS updates, or via an exploit we discovered that allows for BIOS reflash even in the presence of a signed update requirement. We also show how a 51 byte patch to the SRTM can cause it to provide a forged measurement to the TPM indicating that the BIOS is pristine. If a TPM Quote is used to query the boot state of the system, this TPM-signed falsification will then serve as the root of misplaced trust. We also show how reflashing the BIOS may not necessarily remove this trust-subverting malware. To fix the un-trustworthy SRTM we apply an academic technique whereby the BIOS software indicates its integrity through a timing side-channel. Last year at Black Hat, Argyros and Kiayias devastated all things pseudorandom in open-source PHP applications. This year, we’re bringing PRNG attacks to the masses.

PRNG based on a black-box analysis of application output. In many cases, most or all of the PRNG’s internal state can be recovered, enabling determination of past output and prediction of future output. We’ll present algorithms that run many orders of magnitude faster than a brute-force search, including reversing and seeking the PRNG stream in constant time. Finally, of course, we’ll demonstrate everything and give away our tool so that you can perform the attacks during your own assessments.

Now the base operating system is the formerly off-the-shelf RTOS QNX, which doesn’t exactly have an excellent security track record. Moreover, for the first time in BBOS history, native code applications are allowed on the platform. This talk will present an analysis of the attack surface of BBOS 10, considering both ways to escalate privileges locally and routes for remote entry. Moreover, since exploitation is only half the work of offense, we’ll show ways for rootkits to persist on the device. Bluetooth Smart: The Good, The Bad, The Ugly, and The Fix!

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